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NEW MEXICO ANTITRUST LAW-Tying Arrangements Under
the New Mexico Antitrust Act: Smith Machinery Corp. v. Hesston,
Inc.

I. INTRODUCTION
In Smith Machinery Corp. v. Hesston, Inc.' the New Mexico Supreme

Court faced the questions of what standard should govern in determining
whether representative line contracts violate the New Mexico Antitrust
Act2 and how that standard should be interpreted and applied. Representative line contracts, which require a dealer to purchase the entire line of
a manufacturer's products in order to obtain those products it desires,
have been challenged as amounting to tying arrangements. 3 A tying arrangement exists when a seller allows a buyer to purchase a desired or
"tying" product only on the condition that the buyer also purchase an
undesired or "tied" product.4 These types of arrangements are thought
to have a destructive effect on competition5 because they allow a seller
with market power in a tying product to use this leverage to extend its
market power to a tied product. In this way, the seller gains a competitive
advantage in the tied product market by virtue of the tying product's
leverage alone and not because it is a better product or has a lower price.6
As a result, tying arrangements are generally suspect as transgressing
federal and state antitrust laws. 7
1. 102 N.M. 245, 694 P.2d 501 (1985). It is noted that Defendant Hesston Corporation was
misdesignated in the caption as Hesston, Inc. Answer Brief for Defendant-Appellee at ix, Smith
Machinery, 102 N.M. 245, 694 P.2d 501.
2. N.M. STAT. ANN. §§57-1-1 to -19 (1978).
3. This type of arrangement is also described as "full-line forcing" or as a required purchase of
a "representative sample" of products. See, e.g., Earley Ford Tractor, Inc. v. Hesston Corp., 556
F.Supp. 544 (W.D. Mo. 1983); Pitchford v. Pepi, Inc., 531 F.2d 92 (3d Cir. 1975), cert. denied,
426 U.S. 935 (1976); Brandeis Machinery & Supply Corp. v. Barber-Greene Co., 1973-2 Trade
Cas. (CCH) 74,672 (W.D. Ky. 1973), aff'd, 503 F.2d 503 (6th Cir. 1974); Osbom v. Sinclair
Refining Co., 286 F.2d 832 (4th Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 366 U.S. 963 (1961).
4. Northern Pacific Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958).
5. The destructive effect of tying arrangements on competition was noted by the Supreme Court
in Standard Oil Co. v. United States, stating that "[t]ying agreements serve hardly any purpose
beyond the suppression of competition." 337 U.S. 293, 305-06 (1949).
6. In Northern Pacific the Supreme Court noted that tying arrangements "deny competitors free
access to the market for the tied product, not because the party imposing the tying requirements has
a better product or a lower price but because of his power or leverage in another market." 356 U.S.
at 6. See also Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 104 S.Ct. 1551, 1558 (1984) ("forcing"
unwanted product on buyer).
7. Tying arrangements have been successfully challenged under Section 1of the Sherman Antitrust
Act ("Sherman Act"), 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1982) (condemning contracts, combinations, or conspiracies
in restraint of trade); Section 2 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1982) (condemning monopolization); Section 3 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 14 (1982) (condemning tying and exclusive
dealing); and Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. § 45 (1982) (condemning
unfair methods of competition).
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In order to determine the appropriate standard for analyzing tying
arrangements in New Mexico, it was necessary for the court to construe
Section 57-1-1 of the New Mexico Antitrust Act for the first time.8 This
section, while never having been construed by the New Mexico courts,
was patterned after the federal Sherman Antitrust Act ("Sherman Act"). 9
In fact, the New Mexico Antitrust Act seeks uniformity between state
and federal antitrust law, specifically providing that the New Mexico
Antitrust Act be construed consistent with federal court interpretations of
the Sherman Act. "oThe federal courts have long held tying arrangements
subject to a per se analysis.11 The New Mexico Supreme Court, therefore,
adopted the per se rule as the appropriate standard to judge the legality
of tying arrangements under the New Mexico Antitrust Act. 2 The court
then interpreted and applied the per se rule. 3
This Note will review the New Mexico Supreme Court's reasoning for
adopting the per se rule and the underlying rationale for the development
of the per se rule in the federal courts. This Note will then examine the
per se rule and the New Mexico Supreme Court's application of the per
se rule in Smith Machinery. Finally, this Note will consider the implications of the supreme court's adoption of per se illegality for tying
arrangements in New Mexico.
II. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Smith Machinery Corporation ("Smith"), a dealer in irrigation and
farm machinery equipment, 4 had a dealership contract with Hesston, Inc.
("Hesston") that required Smith to carry a representative line of Hesston
8. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 57-1-1 (1978). See infra note 9 and accompanying text.
9. Section 1 of the Sherman Act provides: "Every contract, combination in the form of trust or
otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign
nations, is declared to be illegal." 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1982). Similarly, Section 57-1-1 of the New
Mexico Antitrust Act provides: "Every contract, agreement, combination or conspiracy in restraint
of trade or commerce, any part of which trade or commerce is within this state, is hereby declared
to be unlawful." N.M. STAT. ANN. § 57-1-1 (1978).
10. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 57-1-15 (Cum. Supp. 1983) provides that the New Mexico Antitrust
Act is to be construed "in harmony with judicial interpretations of the federal antitrust laws." The
language of the New Mexico Antitrust Act, however, contains no language or concept similar to
Section 3 of the Clayton Act or to Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act. Therefore, the
analysis of Smith Machinery is in accordance only with the Sherman Act.
11. The federal courts have long held that certain trade agreements have such an anticompetitive
impact that they are presumed unreasonable and therefore illegal per se. Tying arrangements have
been deemed unlawful because of their "pernicious effect on competition and lack of any redeeming
virtue .. ." Northern Pacific, 356 U.S. at 5. Other trade practices deemed unlawful in and of
themselves include price fixing, United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 218, 223
(1940), reh'g denied, 310 U.S. 658 (1940); division of markets, Addyston Pipe & Steel Co. v.
United States, 175 U.S. 211 (1899); group boycotts, Fashion Originators' Guild of America v.
Federal Trade Comm'n, 312 U.S. 457, 468 (1941); and resale price maintenance agreements, KeiferStewart Co. v. Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, Inc., 340 U.S. 211, 213 (1951).
12. Smith Machinery, 102 N.M. at 249, 694 P.2d at 505.
13. Id. at 253-54, 694 P.2d at 509-10.
14. Id. at 246, 694 P.2d at 502.
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equipment. 5 Subsequently, Fiat Corporation acquired controlling interest
in Hesston. 6 Hesston then sought to add a new tractor line manufactured
by Fiat to its product mix and required Smith to carry some of the new
tractors as provided by the dealership contract. 7 Smith refused to take
on the new tractor line but requested that it retain the product lines which
it had marketed for Hesston in past years.' 8 Hesston denied the request,
however, and sought to terminate Smith's distributorship altogether. 9
Smith brought suit claiming that Hesston's conditioning the sale of the
established product lines to the sale of the new tractor line was a "tying
arrangement" amounting to a restraint of trade, and that such a restraint
was per se illegal under the New Mexico Antitrust Act.2 ° The trial court
held that representative line contracts are an exception to the per se rule.2 '
Accordingly, the lower court dismissed the restraint of trade claim at the
conclusion of the plaintiff's case-in-chief.22
On appeal,23 the New Mexico Supreme Court adopted the federal standard of per se illegality as appropriate for analyzing tying arrangements
under the New Mexico Antitrust Act.24 In applying the per se rule, the
Smith Machinery Court held that a manufacturer's requirement that a
dealer add a new tractor line to the existing product mix amounted to a
tying arrangement, that tying arrangements are illegal per se under the
New Mexico Antitrust Act, 25 that representative line forcing is not a wellestablished exception to the per se rule, 26 and that Smith had established
15. Id. at 249, 694 P.2d at 505. Specifically, the contract provided: "Dealer agrees to order, keep
on hand and display a representative sample of each type of Hesston products applicable to Dealer's
trade area." (emphasis added) Answer Brief for Defendant-Appellee at xi, Smith Machinery, 102
N.M. 245, 694 P.2d 501.
16. Smith Machinery, 102 N.M. at 249, 694 P.2d at 505.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Smith Machinery was a contract claim raising antitrust issues; therefore, the case by-passed
the court of appeals and went directly to the supreme court pursuant to N.M. STAT. ANN. Rules of
Appellate Procedure for Criminal, Children's Court, Domestic Relations Matters and Worker's
Compensation Cases at 3 (Repl. Pamp. 1983).
24. Smith Machinery, 102 N.M. at 250-53, 694 P.2d at 506-09. A full discussion of the other
issue addressed by the supreme court, whether a piece of farm machinery called a windrower is a
motor vehicle within the meaning of the Motor Vehicle Franchise Act, N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 57-161 to -16 (1978), is outside the scope of this Note. The court found the windrower is not a vehicle
under the Motor Vehicle Franchising Act and is not covered by the provisions of that Act.
25. Smith Machinery, 102 N.M. at 254, 694 P.2d at 510.
26. Id. at 253, 694 P.2d at 509. The court was unpersuaded by Hesston's contention that representative or full-line forcing is a well-established exception to the application of the per se analysis.
Hesston's only authority for such an exception was a 1951 decision stating that full-line forcing of
farm implements "is not violative of any law." United States v. J.1. Case Co., 101 F.Supp 856,
867 (D. Minn. 1951). The court placed little weight on the Case decision, largely because the modem
law of tying arrangements was only beginning to be formulated in 1951 and subsequent decisions
developing the law of tying arrangements failed to support the Case approach. Smith Machinery,
102 N.M. at 251-53, 694 P.2d at 507-09.
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a primafacie case under the per se rule.27 The court remanded the case

for a determination of whether Smith's primafacie case was rebutted or
whether any business justifications for the tying arrangement were present.28
III. DISCUSSION AND ANALYSIS
A. The New Mexico Supreme CourtAdopted the Per Se Rule as the
Standardfor Judging the Legality of Tying Arrangements Under the
New Mexico Antitrust Act

Section 57-1-1 of the New Mexico Antitrust Act29 is patterned after
Section 1 of the federal Sherman Act.3" The New Mexico Antitrust Act
specifically provides for it to be construed "in harmony with judicial
interpretations of the federal antitrust laws." 3 1 In the absence of New
Mexico decisions construing the pertinent section of the New Mexico
Antitrust Act, the New Mexico Supreme Court turned to federal case law
interpreting the like section of the Sherman Act.32
Broadly stated, the purpose of both the New Mexico and federal antitrust laws is the protection of trade and commerce from unlawful restraints and monopolies, the maintenance of free competition, and the
prevention of undue interference with the free exercise of the rights of
those engaged in trade and commerce. 33 Specifically, both Acts prohibit
trade practices which "unreasonably" restrain competition. 34 Whether a
27. Smith Machinery, 102 N.M. at 254, 694 P.2d at 510.
28. Id. Although the case was remanded, the parties stipulated to a dismissal of the state court
action on December 5, 1985. Subsequently, the federal antitrust claims and pendent state claims
were refiled in federal district court.
29. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 57-1-1 (1978). See supra note 9.
30. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1982). See supra note 9.
31. N.M.STAT. ANN. §57-1-15 (Cum. Supp. 1983).
32. See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
33. See generally Sullivan, Antitrust (1977).
34. The Sherman Act provides "[e]very contract, combination ... or conspiracy, in restraint of
trade or commerce . . .is declared to be illegal .. " 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1982). Similarly, the New
Mexico Antitrust Act states "[e]very contract, agreement, combination or conspiracy in restraint of
trade or commerce ... is hereby declared to be unlawful." N.M. STAT. ANN. § 57-1-1 (1978). This
language prohibiting every contract, combination or conspiracy in restraint of trade or commerce is
literally all encompassing, however, courts have construed this language as precluding only those
contracts or combinations which "unreasonably" restrain competition. Northern Pacific, 356 U.S.
at 5. The early decisions of the Supreme Court construing the Sherman Act, contain language to
the effect that literally every contract or combination, whether reasonable or unreasonable, which
directly restrains trade or commerce is unlawful under the statute. See United States v. Joint Traffic
Ass'n, 171 U.S. 505 (1898); United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Ass'n, 166 U.S 290, 328
(1897). Subsequently, however, this language was limited and qualified by a United States Supreme
Court holding that, because the statute does not define the term "restraint of trade," it is necessary
for the court to do so and this duty can only be discharged by a resort to reason. United States v.
American Tobacco Co., 221 U.S. 106, 178-79 (1911). In applying the rule of reason to the construction of the statute, the court determined the rule to be that only undue or unreasonable restraints
of trade or commerce are prohibited by this statute. Appalachian Coals v. United States, 288 U.S.
344 (1933); Standard Oil, 221 U.S. at 1.
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trade practice is unreasonable is determined through the application of
two subsidiary rules, the rule of reason35 and the per se rule. 36 In most
cases, the rule of reason determines the legality of a given trade restraint;
resort to the per se rule is appropriate only when the arrangement in
question is viewed as a "naked restraint of trade." 37 Tying arrangements
are among those trade agreements so viewed in federal antitrust case
law. 38
In accordance with the New Mexico Antitrust Act's mandate that it be
construed consistent with judicial interpretations of the federal antitrust
laws, the New Mexico Supreme Court adopted per se illegality for tying
arrangements in New Mexico without questioning the underlying rationale
for this proscription. Thus, while not clearly articulated by the New
Mexico Supreme Court, it is fair to assume that the court was swayed
by the rationale developed in the federal courts since they adopted the
federal per se standard. The rationale for proscribing tying arrangements,
developed under federal antitrust law and followed by the New Mexico
35. One of the most frequently cited statements of the rule of reason is that of Mr. Justice Brandeis
in Chicago Bd. of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918):
The true test of legality is whether the restraint imposed is such as merely regulates
and perhaps thereby promotes competition or whether it is such as may suppress
or even destroy competition. To determine that question the court must ordinarily
consider the facts peculiar to the business to which the restraint is applied; its
condition before and after the restraint was imposed; the nature of the restraint
and its effect, actual or probable. The history of the restraint, the evil believed
to exist, the reason for adopting the particular remedy, the purpose or end sought
to be attained, are all relevant facts. This is not because a good intention will
save an otherwise objectionable regulation or the reverse; but because knowledge
of intent may help the court to interpret facts and to predict consequences.
The rule of reason thus calls on courts to judge shades and gradations of competitive impact.
36. The per se rule of illegality is appropriate when the trade practices in question are manifestly
anticompetitive. As the Supreme Court explained in Northern Pacific, "there are certain agreements
or practices which because of their pernicious effect on competition and lack of any redeeming virtue
are conclusively presumed to be unreasonable and therefore illegal without elaborate inquiry as to
the precise harm they have caused or the business excuse for their use." 356 U.S. at 5. Thus, per
se rules require the Court to make broad generalizations about the social utility of a particular trade
practice. This necessarily involves a balancing of the probability and severity of anticompetitive
consequences resulting from a particular practice, against the probability of the practice's procompetitive consequences. Cases that do not fit the generalization may arise, but a per se rule reflects
the judgment that such cases are not sufficiently common or important to justify the time and expense
necessary to identify them.
37. See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
38. Id. The first United States Supreme Court opinion to enunciate a standard for striking down
tying arrangements as illegal per se under the federal antitrust laws was International Salt Co. v.
United States, 332 U.S. 392 (1947). International Salt made contract clauses tying products or
processes illegal per se, once it has been established that "the volume of business affected" is not
"insignificant or insubstantial" and that the effect of the contracts is to "foreclose competitors from
[a]
substantial market." 332 U.S. at 396. The proscription of tying arrangements has been approved
on a number of occasions since International Salt. See, e.g., Northern Pacific, 356 U.S. at 6; Fortner
Enterprises, Inc., v. U.S. Steel Corp., ("Fortner 1"), 394 U.S. 495, 499-500 (1969); Hyde, 104
S.Ct. at 1556-57.
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Supreme Court, rests on a "leverage theory." 39 According to the leverage
theory, competitors are denied free access to the tied product market not
because the seller has a superior product in that market, but because of
the seller's power or leverage which is exerted through the tying product. 4
The harm resulting from such leverage is three-fold: competitors in the
tied product market are injured if they cannot offer their products on an
equal basis with the distributor of the tying product; buyers are injured
because they forego choices among products and services; and the public
is harmed by the adverse effect on the market for the tied product.4 '
Although the New Mexico Supreme Court did not discuss the criticism
of the leverage rationale, it is crucial to recognize this criticism since the
adoption of the per se rule implicitly rejects the contrary argument. Underlying the criticism is the belief that antitrust illegality should be governed by the demonstrated economic impact in the tied product market
rather than the assumption of leverage based on the seller's control or
dominance over the tying product market. Critics contend that, from a
purely economic standpoint, tie-ins should be analyzed according to the
rule of reason, on a case-by-case basis, as all tie-ins are not inherently
detrimental. In fact, tying arrangements can be beneficial by facilitating
entry into established markets, promoting price competition, and, in certain cases, reducing costs of production and distribution.4 2 Economists
and critics argue that the legality of a tying arrangement should turn on
Inc., ("Former H"), 429 U.S. 610, 617-22
39. See U.S. Steel Corp. v. Fortner Enterprises,
"
(1977) and cases cited therein. The theory of leveraging," the traditional justification for objecting
to tying arrangements, focuses on preventing a seller with market power in the tying product market
from "leveraging" his market power into the tied product market. Such a situation is only possible
where the seller has some "control or dominance over the tying product." Northern Pacific, 356
U.S. at 6. In a situation where the tied product is useful only in combination with the tying product,
the short term effect may indeed be a restriction on competition in the tied market; that is, the seller
will have successfully imposed barriers to entry in the tied market which preclude competitors from
selling their product. In a situation where there are uses for the tied product unrelated to the tying
product, however, the leverage theory loses its appeal as an explanation for the seller's conduct.
For further discussion of the leverage theory, see Bork, The Antitrust Paradox, 365-81 (1978);
Posner, Exclusionary Practices and the Antitrust Laws, 41 U. CHi. L. REV. 506 (1974); Bowman,
Tying Arrangements and the Leverage Problem, 67 YALE L.J. 19 (1957).
40. Northern Pacific, 356 U.S. at 6.
41. See Times-Picayune Publishing Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594, 605 (1953); see also
Pearson, Tying Arrangements and Antitrust Policy, 60 Nw. U.L. REV. 626, 631 (1965).
42. As Justice White stated in Fortner 1:
[tlie-ins ... may facilitate entry into fields where established sellers have wedded
their customers to them by ties of habit and custom. [citations omitted] . . .They
may permit clandestine price cutting in products which otherwise would have no
price competition at all because of fear of retaliation from the few other producers
dealing in the market. They may protect the reputation of the tying product if
failure to use the tied product in conjunction with it may cause it to misfunction.
[citations omitted] . . .And, if the tied and tying products are functionally related,
they may reduce costs through economies of joint production and distribution.
394 U.S. at 514 n. 9 (White, J., dissenting).
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the demonstrated economic consequences of the arrangement and should
be prohibited only when its anticompetitive impact outweighs its contribution to economic efficiency.43 The New Mexico Supreme Court, however, adopted the per se rule as the appropriate standard for judging the
legality of tying arrangements under the New Mexico Antitrust Act, as
mandated by that Act, critical commentary notwithstanding.
B. The Per Se Rule
Tying arrangements are among the few areas of federal antitrust law
that have been singled out and labeled as illegal "per se. "' The New
Mexico Supreme Court, in adopting the federal standard, clearly artic"5
ulated the per se rule as it applies to tying arrangements. In order for
tying arrangements to fall into the category of a per se antitrust violation
under federal and now New Mexico law, three prerequisites must be
shown: 1) there must be a tying arrangement between two distinct products-the tying product and the tied product; 2) the seller must have
sufficient economic power in the tying product market to impose significant restrictions in the tied product market; and 3) the amount of com46
merce affected in the tied product market must be "not insubstantial."
The New Mexico Supreme Court, while clearly stating the per se rule,
goes on to apply this rule with little explanation. Thus, this Note will
delineate the prerequisites of the per se rule before setting out the New
Mexico Supreme Court's analysis.
The first element necessary for a showing of per se illegality, known
as the "two-product rule," requires that the tying and tied items be
separate products.47 Whether the seller utilized two distinct products in
a tying arrangement turns not on the functional relation between the two
8
products, but on the character of the demand for the two items. For
example, anesthesiological services rendered by an independent contrac43. See infra note 79 and accompanying text. See also Markovits, Tie-Ins, Reciprocity and the
Leverage Theory, 76 YALE L.J. 1397, 1397-98 (1967); Burstein, A Theory of Full-Line Forcing, 55
Nw. U.L. REV. 62, 62-63 (1960). But see Turner, The Validity of Tying Arrangements Under the
Antitrust Laws, 72 HARv. L. REV. 50 (1958); Areeda, Introduction to Antitrust Economics, 52
A.B.A. ANTrrRUST L.J. 523 (1983).
44. See supra notes 37-38 and accompanying text.
45. Smith Machinery, 102 N.M. at 250, 694 P.2d at 506.
46. Fortner 1, 394 U.S. at 499; Northern Pacific, 356 U.S. at 6. This proscription of tying
arrangements, while commonly referred to as per se illegality, is more correctly characterized as a
qualified per se rule as it applies only when the three threshold requirements are established.
47. See Fortner1, 394 U.S. at 507 ("there is, at the outset of every tie-in case ... the problem
of determining whether two separate products are in fact involved. "). For a complete discussion of
the considerations involved in the two separate product aspect of the per se rule, see United States
v. Jerrold Electronics Corp., 187 F.Supp 545, 559 (E.D. Pa. 1960), affd, 365 U.S. 567 (1961);
Hyde, 104 S.Ct. at 1562; see also Turner, The Validity of Tying Arrangements Under the Antitrust
Laws, 72 HARv. L. REV. 50, 67-72 (1958).
48. Hyde, 104 S.Ct. at 1562.
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tor and hospital services have been held to be distinguishable products,
as consumer-patients often request specific anesthesiologists to come to
a hospital and provide anesthesia. 49 On the other hand, a morning and
an evening newspaper have been held to be indistinguishable products
because from the viewpoint of the consumer-advertiser the two newspapers
were perceived as providing access to the same readership mar50
ket.
As these examples illustrate, a tying arrangement cannot exist unless
two separate products, distinct from the perspective of the consumer,
have been linked . 5 Furthermore, in order to qualify as separate products,
there must be sufficient demand for the tied product to identify a distinct
market in which it is efficient to offer the tied product separately from
the tying product.52 This requirement that two distinguishable products
be involved stems from the economic concerns underlying the proscription
of tying arrangements-in order for a tying arrangement to have an anticompetitive effect, two distinct products necessarily must be linked.
The second element needed to establish per se illegality is "sufficient
economic power" in the tying market. The federal courts have concluded
that an essential characteristic of an invalid tying arrangement is the
seller's exploitation of its control over the tying product to force the buyer
to purchase an unwanted tied product.53 Thus, this element focuses on
proof that the seller has sufficient market power and therefore leverage
in the tying product market.
Typically, the element of sufficient economic power may be satisfied
in three ways. First, where the seller has a legal monopoly in the tying
product, sufficient economic power is presumed because the buyer cannot
purchase the product elsewhere. Thus, sufficient economic power is demonstrated when the tying product is patented or copyrighted.54 Second,
sufficient economic power is present if the seller has some advantage not
shared by its competitors in the tying product market.55 This advantage
49. Id. at 1564.
50. Times-Picayune Publishing, 345 U.S. at 613-14.
51. Hyde, 104 S.Ct. at 1562.
52. Id. at 1563.
53. Id. at 1558.
54. United States v. Loew's Inc., 371 U.S. 38, 45-47 (1962). A patent is at least prima facie
evidence of market control. Times-Picayune Publishing, 345 U.S. at 594. This presumption stems
from a hostility toward the use of the statutorily granted patent monopoly to extend the patentee's
economic control to unpatented products. See also Fortner1, 392 U.S. at 504-06 and n. 2.
55. Former 1, 394 U.S. at 502. The Supreme Court refined the standard of "sufficient economic
power" in Former II, stating:
[while tie-in cases do not] require that the [seller] have a monopoly or even a
dominant position throughout the market for a tying product . . . [t]hey do,
however, focus attention on the question whether the seller has the power, within
the market for the tying product, to raise prices or to require purchasers to accept
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over competitors may be shown a number of different ways; for example,
by proof of the tying product's unique attributes over competitor's products,56 or by the seller's ability to raise prices above levels that would
be charged in a competitive market.57 Third, sufficient economic market
power is inferred when the seller has dominant market position or a
significant share of a relevant market.5" This market share inquiry will
necessarily turn on the facts and circumstances of any challenged arrangement. The United States Supreme Court, for example, in the context
of anesthesiological and hospital services, found a 30 percent share of a
relevant geographic market to be insufficient proof of economic power.5 9
In the context of tying the sale of tires, batteries and automobile accessories to the sale of gasoline, however, a lower federal court found a
market share of 10 percent adequate for purposes of establishing sufficient
economic power.'
The final element of the per se analysis considers whether a "not
insubstantial" amount of commerce is involved in the tying arrangement.
A "not insubstantial" amount of commerce is involved where the dollarvolume of business foreclosed in the tied market is not merely de minimis.6 For purposes of making this determination, the relevant figure is
the total amount of sales tied by the arrangement being challenged, and
is not limited to the portion of this total accounted for by the particular
plaintiff who brings the suit.62
burdensome terms that could not be exacted in a completely competitive market.
In short, the question is whether the seller has some advantage not shared by his
competitors in the market for the tying product.
429 U.S. at 620.
56. The product for which the claim of uniqueness in attributes is typically made is that of real
estate since any piece of real estate is unique. See, e.g., Former 1, 394 U.S. at 495; Rosebrough
Monument Co. v. Memorial Park Cemetery, 666 F.2d 1130, 1143 (8th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 457
U.S. 1111 (1982).
57. See Fortner II, 429 U.S. at 620; see also Hyde, 104 U.S. at 1566 n. 46.
58. In its most recent tie-in decision, the Hyde case, the Supreme Court suggested that there must
be "significant market power," a "kind of dominant market position," and found that a 30 percent
share of a relevant geographic market was insufficient. 104 S.Ct. at 1566. The Court's reliance in
Hyde on a defined geographic market and the seller's share of that market arguably marks a departure
from the previous market power standard in tie-in cases, articulated in Fortner I and Fortner H.
Former H, however, was cited with apparent approval in Hyde, 104 S.Ct. at 1566 n. 46. Thus, a
fair conclusion is that the market power requirement in a tie-in case can now be proved, or disproved,
by the Hyde geographic market definition and market share approach as well as the Fortner I1
standard of advantage over competitors. See, e.g., Digidyne Corp. v. Data General Corp., 1984-1
Trade Cas. (CCH) 66,053 (9th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 105 S.Ct. 3534 (1985), reh'g denied, 106
S.Ct. 18 (1985) (post-Hyde case relying on Fortner11).
59. Hyde, 104 S.Ct. at 1566. See supra note 58 for a summary of the case.
60. Osbom v. Sinclair Refining Co., 286 F.2d 832, 838 (4th Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 366 U.S.
963 (1961).
61. Fortnerl, 394 U.S. at 501.
62. Id. Demonstration of foreclosure of commerce by sums as low as $60,800 is sufficient to
comply with this requirement. See also Loew's, 371 U.S. at 49.
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Once a per se tying arrangement is established, the seller may still
prevail by offering a compelling business justification for the arrangement.63 Although the most common justification for tying arrangements
is the need to preserve quality control and customer good will,' tying
arrangements have been justified upon a showing of necessity by a company trying to establish a new industry,65 or enter a new market.'
C. The New Mexico Supreme Court's Per Se Analysis
In Smith Machinery, the New Mexico Supreme Court found the first
element of distinct products satisfied under the two-product rule.67 The
court found the new line of Fiat tractors and the existing product lines
including hay processing equipment to be clearly distinct items from a
consumer's perspective. Thus, consistent with federal per se analysis,
the Smith Machinery Court found the first element of per se illegality
was present.
In considering the second element of the per se analysis, sufficient
economic power, the Smith Machinery Court applied a "market share"
approach' and determined that a 30 percent market share in hay processing equipment was sufficient to amount to an appreciable restraint on
competition.' In reaching this conclusion, however, the court omitted
any discussion of the relevant geographic market basis from which the
63. Early tying cases held that once tying arrangements were found to exist in the context of
sufficient economic power affecting a "not insubstantial" amount of commerce, the tying arrangements were illegal without elaborate inquiry into the business excuses for their use. See Northern
Pacific, 356 U.S. at 6. This reasoning is consistent with the underlying rationale for restricting tying
arrangements-that they serve no purpose other than the suppression of competition. Standard Oil,
337 U.S. at 305-06. Some courts, however, have carved limited inroads into the rigid per se rule
by recognizing exceptional circumstances in which business justifications render lawful a tie-in that
otherwise possesses the requisite elements of per se illegality. See Susser v. Carvel Corp., 332 F.2d
505 (2d. Cir. 1964), cert. granted, 379 U.S. 885 (1964), cert. dismissed, 381 U.S. 125 (1965);
Jerrold Electronics, 187 F.Supp at 545; Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 330
(1962); Harley Davidson Motor Co., 50 F.T.C. 1047, 1059-60, 1066 (1954).
64. See Susser, 332 F.2d at 505 (customer goodwill held to justify a soft ice cream franchisor's
requirement that a franchisee buy from it all supplies which form a part of the end product); but
see, Standard Oil, 337 U.S. at 293 (business justification failed because specifications of the type
and quality of the products to be used in connection with the tying product were said to be protection
enough); Siegel v. Chicken Delight, Inc., 448 F.2d 43 (9th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 955
(1972) (customer goodwill held not a justification for requiring a chicken franchisee to buy the
franchisor's packaging, mixes, and equipment).
65. See JerroldElectronics, 187 F.Supp. at 545 (policy of selling community television antenna
equipment only in conjunction with a service contract was not an unreasonable restraint of trade at
the industry's inception).
66. See Brown Shoe, 370 U.S. at 294; Harley Davidson, 50 F.T.C. at 1047.
67. Smith Machinery, 102 N.M. at 253, 694 P.2d at 509.
68. As noted supra there are several ways of establishing sufficient economic power, including
patents or copyrights, advantage over competitors and geographic market share. See supra notes 5460 and accompanying text.
69. Smith Machinery, 102 N.M. at 253, 694 P.2d at 509.
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30 percent market share was drawn. While this omission makes a detailed
analysis difficult, the sufficient economic power element of the per se
rule does turn on the facts and circumstances of each individual case. 7"
Theoretically, therefore, this factor should not be considered a "bench
mark" for subsequent cases, absent the same two products involved in
the same trade restraint. Realistically, however, the 30 percent market
share figure in this case does establish a reference mark for all future tiein cases brought in New Mexico. By not clearly articulating its reasoning
for finding the element of sufficient economic power satisfied in this case,
the New Mexico Supreme Court fails to provide a functional guideline
for the practitioner seeking to interpret the New Mexico Antitrust Act.
Thus, this omission undermines the notions of predictability and guidance
for the New Mexico business community--qualities which per se proscription are perceived as providing.
In addition, it should be noted that the 30 percent market share found
sufficient without explanation in Smith Machinery was exactly the percent
of market share found insufficient by the United States Supreme Court
in Jefferson ParishHosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde.7 This variation might be
attributable to the differences inherent between hospital services and hay
processing equipment. The Smith Machinery Court's opinion, however,
is void of any explanation or discussion of this distinction. The failure
of the court to delineate the distinction it presumably drew regarding
percent of market share frustrates the notion of per se predictability and
provides little guidance to the New Mexico business community for future
interpretation of the New Mexico Antitrust Act.
Finally, the Smith Machinery Court considered whether a "not insubstantial" amount of commerce was involved.72 The amount of business
foreclosed to competitors by a tying arrangement is properly measured
in terms of the total dollar volume of sales affected by the arrangement
in the market overall. 73 The Smith Machinery Court, however, determined
that a substantial amount of commerce was foreclosed based on Smith's
representation alone.74 The court, therefore, found it unnecessary to look
beyond the particular plaintiff bringing the suit to the total dollar volume
of sales affected in the overall market. 75
The supreme court thus held that Smith had established a primafacie
70. See supra notes 58-60 and accompanying text.
71. 104 S.Ct. 1551 (1984). See also supra note 59 and accompanying text.
72. Smith Machinery, 102 N.M. at 253-54, 694 P.2d at 509-10.
73. Id. at 254, 694 P.2d at 510. See supra notes 61-62 and accompanying text.
74. Smith Machinery, 102 N.M. at 254, 694 P.2d at 510. The court concluded the evidence,
which demonstrated the effect of the arrangement on Smith alone resulted in a foreclosure of
commerce in the range of $100,000 to $300,000, was substantial enough not to be considered de
minimis.
75. Smith Machinery, 102 N.M. at 254, 694 P.2d at 510.
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case of a per se illegal tying arrangement and remanded the case to the
district court for a determination of whether Hesston could successfully
demonstrate a business justification for the tying arrangement imposed
on Smith.76

D. Implications of Smith Machinery v. Hesston
By adopting the per se rule for judging the legality of tying arrangements under the New Mexico Antitrust Act, the New Mexico Supreme
Court acknowledged that presumptive illegality serves three vital functions. First, the per se doctrine provides predictable and workable rules
which in turn provide guidance to the business community as to the
particular types of trade restraints condemned as unlawful by the New
Mexico Antitrust Act. Second, the per se rule seeks to avoid a complicated
and prolonged economic investigation77 and diminishes the extent of inquiry required by New Mexico courts as to the nature, purpose and effect
of any challenged arrangement before reaching a decision about its legality. Third, this reduction in economic inquiry serves to minimize the
burden on litigants and the judicial system of undergoing the more complex and expensive rule-of-reason trials.
The underlying leverage rationale" for per se proscription of tying
arrangements, however, has been earnestly questioned by commentators
and economists,79 as well as several courts.8 0 This criticism stems from
the conviction that antitrust proscription should be determined by the
demonstrated economic impact in the tied product market rather than the
assumption of leverage based on the seller's control or dominance over
the tying product market. Critics contend the legality of a tying arrangement should be judged by the actual economic consequences of the arrangement and should be proscribed only when its anticompetitive impact
outweighs its contribution to economic efficiency."
It is clear that the supreme court's adoption of per se illegality for
tying arrangements is consistent with the long line of federal court de76. Id. See supra notes 63-66 and accompanying text.
77. Northern Pacific, 356 U.S. at 5. Critics argue that the distinction between the per se rule
and the rule of reason is somewhat mitigated; that the qualifications to the per se rule require an
elaborate economic inquiry and at the same time stop short of achieving the benefits of the rule of
reason. See, e.g., Hyde, 104 S.Ct. at 1569 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
78. See supra notes 39-41 and accompanying text.
79. See, e.g., Bork, The Antitrust Paradox, 365-81 (1978); Posner, Exclusionary Practices and
the Antitrust Laws, 41 U. CI. L. REV. 506 (1974); Bowman, Tying Arrangements and the Leverage
Problem, 67 YALE L.J. 19 (1957).
80. See, e.g., Hyde, 104 S.Ct. at 1569 (O'Connor, I., concurring); Shop and Save Food Markets,
Inc. v. Pneumo Corp., 683 F.2d 27, 31 (2d Cir. 1982) (Feinberg, C.J., concurring), cert. denied,
459 U.S. 1038 (1982); Hirsh v. Martindale-Hubbel, Inc., 674 F.2d 1343, 1349 n. 19 (9th Cir. 1982),
cert. denied, 459 U.S. 973 (1982).
81. See supra notes 42-43 and accompanying text.
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cisions, beginning with InternationalSalt v. United States in 194982 and
reaffirmed recently in Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde. 3 It is
arguable, however, that from an economic perspective, tie-ins should be
governed by a rule-of-reason analysis, on a case-by-case basis.84 By
adopting the per se rule the supreme court followed the federal courts'
notions of efficiency and economics, and adopted the federal courts'
conclusions that the policies of judicial economy and certainty of interpretation outweigh the need for economic principles and market realities."
IV. CONCLUSION
The New Mexico Antitrust Act directs the supreme court to construe
the Act consistent with the federal court interpretations of the Sherman
Act. 86 Thus, the importance of the decision in Smith Machinery is the
New Mexico Supreme Court's interpretation and application of the federal
antitrust cases.
The federal courts have long held tying arrangements subject to a per
se analysis, critical commentary notwithstanding. 87 By adhering to the
federal courts' three-pronged test of per se illegality for tying arrangements, the New Mexico Supreme Court acknowledged that economic
issues in even a "garden-run" antitrust case can be complex, particularly
to a bench and bar for the most part untrained in economics. The per se
doctrine alleviates the necessity of courts to engage in a prolonged inquiry
of the economic impact of such arrangements on competition, which in
turn minimizes the burden on litigants and the judicial system of the more
complex rule of reason trials. Further, the per se doctrine provides guidance to the New Mexico business community regarding the type of trade
restraints which are proscribed by the New Mexico Antitrust Act.
Recent federal court opinions, however, indicate an increased scrutiny
of the underlying rationale for per se proscription of tying arrangements."8
Specifically, federal court opinions suggest that because per se proscription of tying arrangements adheres to a three-pronged threshold inquiry
the distinction between the per se rule and the rule of reason is to a large
82. 332 U.S. at 392. See supra note 38.
83. 104 S.Ct. at 1551. The Supreme Court stated: "It is far too late in the history of our antitrust
jurisprudence to question the proposition that certain tying arrangements pose an unacceptable risk
of stifling competition and therefore are unreasonable 'per se.'" Id. at 1556. Thus, a majority of
the court expressly rejected the view of four concurring justices that the per se rule for tying cases
should be abandoned.
84. See supra notes 79-80 and accompanying text.
85. See supra note 36 and accompanying text.
86. See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
87. See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
88. See, e.g., Hyde, 104 S.Ct. at 1574 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
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extent mitigated.89 That is, the per se standard utilized in tying arrangement analysis does require an elaborate inquiry into the economic effects
of an arrangement in order to establish the three per se factors of two
distinct products, sufficient economic power and affecting a "not insubstantial" amount of commerce." Thus, the costs of a per se analysis can
be equal to those incurred under the rule of reason, yet the per se rule
stops short of achieving any corresponding benefits. In addition, the
underlying theory of leverage has been persuasively questioned. 9 These
criticisms provide a compelling argument for the abandonment of the per
se rule and a refocusing of tie-in proscription in terms of economic
principles and demonstrated market realities.
In Smith Machinery, the New Mexico Supreme Court, as directed by
the New Mexico Antitrust Act, followed the prevailing interpretation of
federal antitrust law for the proscription of tying arrangements. Should
the federal courts, however, continue to question the appropriateness of
the per se rule, and should the federal courts begin to move away from
per se proscription, so too should the New Mexico courts.
KATHRYN HOLMES SNEDAKER

89. Id.
90. Id.
91. See supra notes 78-80 and accompanying text.

